Social Sciences and
Religion:
What Relationship?
By
Mustapha Achoui
International conference
organized by:
The association of
Muslim social Scientists
Vergenia (
Introduction:
When
we mention psychology today, the first thing that comes to the mind of a great
deal of Muslims, particularly those who are not specialized in the field, is
'Freud'; from then on a succession of ideas leads to the fact that this 'Freud'
was born a Jew, and is furthermore, an atheist who wrote books against
religion. As for sociology, when it is mentioned, it is instantly associated
with Durkheim and Marx, and the fact that they were also Jewish, atheist, and
against religion, is also recollected.
This
kind of relationship between certain branches of the social sciences and
religion, which is so palpably engraved in the minds of our intellectuals and
Muslim thinkers, explains the reason why some of these thinkers, and some of
the Muslim scholars (ulema) have taken a negative stand, if not an
opposing one, vis-a-vis the social sciences; especially towards psychology and
sociology. Undeniably, quite a number of psychologists and sociologists are in
fact atheists, and have indeed made religion the object of their criticism,
disrespect, and have assigned themselves the task of refuting all that
appertains to religion, whether it be institutions or thought. Whereas some
have extended their negative position towards religion, and have disputed its
origin, function and the role it plays in society altogether. We will exhibit
some of these views in the forthcoming pages
However
much this may be true, we should not brand all psychologists, sociologists and
social scientists as being atheistic, irreligious and determined to fight
religion; neither should this state of affairs, in my opinion, allow us to
not distinguish between the social
sciences on the one hand, with the subject matters and methodologies pertaining
to them; and the thinkers on the other hand, as people with their own tendencies,
beliefs, ideologies, and even desires and caprices. So, the aim of this study
is confined to the nature of the relationship between the social sciences and
religion, within the framework of Islamic thought, and also in Western thought.
It takes into account the intellectual changes that have taken place in the
West and in the Muslim world throughout the course of history, especially in
those aspects related to the progress of the sciences, and their subsequent
attempts at separating themselves from philosophy and religion. It also looks
at the intellectual changes that began in the nineteenth century and reached
their peak in the twentieth. During this process we will look closely at the
high status enjoyed by the social sciences, and the role they have played in
society, especially in the West.
To
delineate the core of this relationship (i.e.. between the social sciences and
religion) I envisage the following questions to be relevant to our topic:
1) What relationship is there between the social
sciences and philosophy in the context of Islamic civilization?
2) What relationship is there between the social
sciences and the Islamic sciences?
3) What type of relationships do the social
sciences and religion enjoy in the context of Western thought?
4) What relationship is there between the social
sciences and values in general?
5) What is the future of the relationship
between the social sciences and religion overall?
I
would like to quickly draw your attention to the fact that the answers to these
questions require long discussions and exhaustive research. My aim is only to
raise these issues to be debated amongst the specialists, in the hope that
Muslim scholars specializing in the field of social sciences would, on the one
hand, provide us with ways to get out of the Lizard's hole; and on the other
would keep us from erring into nonsensical myth, delusion and obscure Sufi
'theopathetic locutions' and babble talk; all of which do not provide Muslims
with the framework with which to surmount long centuries of underdevelopment.
This
brief study is, actually, an introduction to auto-criticism of academic theses
that are brought forward today by Muslim scholars and specialists in social
sciences. This criticism is not aiming to underestimate these efforts, nor is
it aiming to refute them. On the contrary, these steps are taken in an endeavor
to try to urge those endowed with enthusiasm to increase their efforts towards
producing more scientific and practical alternatives, to enable us to diagnose
our shortcomings. Also for them to suggest ways of advancement to us, rather
than us being led up the garden path and
being presented with empty slogans, which only cause us to stray further away
from our final aspirations and goals. Aspirations and goals can be shown to be
within arm's reach, when in fact what is really being shown is a mirage, and
only a mirage.
Before
undertaking this task, I should emphasize that what is meant by religion in
this study is Islam, whenever we are discussing religion in the context of
Islamic thought; whereas in the context of Western thought, it refers then to
any belief system. Furthermore, the approach of this study is not based upon
unilateral visions and opinions, neither is the bilateral approach applicable.
What we have here is, in fact, an attempt to examine the social sciences and
their relationship with religion, from various angles, through discussing views
in relation to Islamic thought and Western thought, using relevant examples.
The nature of the relationship between the
social sciences and philosophy.
What
is agreed between men of science, scholars and philosophers alike, is that
philosophy was the 'mother of science'. However, this belief which prevails in
Western culture does not have a place in an Islamic setting. Thus, philosophy
has never been regarded as the 'mother of science' in the field of Islam. Here
it is the judicio-religious sciences based on the Qur'an and the example of the
Prophet (the sunnah), which are the supreme sciences, and the basis of all
the sciences.
Greek philosophy passed through many phases during the course of
history, i.e.. during the pre-Christian period, the post-Christian period, the
Islamic period, and finally its recent development during the contemporary
Western period. We will confine our attention to the latter two phases. In the
following paragraphs a brief account of the position of philosophy and its
relationship with the other sciences during these two phases is given.
1) Philosophy's status within the Islamic
civilisation framework.
Philosophy or wisdom (hikmah) had not gained much importance in
the history of the Arabs prior to Islam. As a matter of fact, philosophy did
not occupy any scientific seat during the first chapter of Islamic history,
which covered the Prophetic period and the Caliphates of the rightly guided
Caliphs. This was simply because the Holy Qur'an and the honorable sunnah,
as origins of faith and jurisprudence, amply sufficed the early Muslims to
answer their questions related to the universe, its Creator, life and death,
the creation of man, and his nature and his mission. However the rapidly
spreading conquests, and extensions of the boundaries of the Caliphate resulted
in the Arab Muslims coming in contact with a number of different cultures and
philosophies, such as the Greek, Persian, Indian, and Judeo-Christian
philosophies and other religions and
philosophical sects. It is against this background that the science of
scholastic theology (kalam) emerged during the Abbasid period. Indeed,
the Mutazilites came into existence in response to the deviated streams and
false trends that appeared as the Muslims came in contact with the Magians of
Persia and the Hindus. In order to defend the Islamic beliefs (aqida)
the Mutazilites resorted to Greek philosophy, which was at the time gradually
being translated into Arabic (Kasim, 1969). Whilst there is no need to dwell
upon the various schools of kalam here, it is perhaps worth noting that
their intellectual exertions and struggles ended with the loss of the
Mutazilites to the Asharites, the victory of the 'People of the sunnah' (Ahli
al-sunnah), and the Jabarite (determinist) trend succeeding over the
supporters of the rationalist school and the school of free arbitration (Kasim,
1969. Bintu Shati, 1983). This win has been one of the biggest causes of the
underdevelopment amongst the Muslims during the last few centuries.
The nature of the struggle between the various schools was such that the
ulema, being so absorbed in the issue of aqida, did not show
enough interest in the psychological, sociological, economic and political
problems of the Muslim society. Instead, more often than not, their
intellectual exertions served as a disguise for a struggle for power and a
concealment of real social and economic issues. Kasim (1969) pointed to this fact when he said: "The
Ummayad sided with the Jabarites because their protagonist views suited, and
endorsed the ruling class against their opponents, explaining that the
transition of the Caliphate to them was only by
God's Destiny." (p.7)
Coincidentally,
these were the same tactics followed by the French colonialists in Algeria, as
they too mobilized the Sheikhs of some Sufi orders to spread the Jabarite (determinism)
trend among the population, to make them believe that the French
colonization was a predestined that could not be revoked, a fait accompli!
Imam Abdul-Hamid ben Badis fought with great courage and decisiveness against
the defeatist attitude which was predominant as a result of that campaign.
The position of philosophy in comparison to the other sciences remained
weak in the context of Islamic thought, until the time of Maimonides who
founded a library, Dar-al Hikmah, for the translation of the Greek
philosophical heritage, which, as it is known, was an ensemble of philosophy,
medicine and mathematics. There is no doubt that the logic of Aristotle and his
views on the soul, the physical world and metaphysics, ran through the works of
many Muslim philosophers, doctors and mathematicians. However, despite the
indisputable impact of Aristotle, Plato and other Greek philosophers, we find
that a number of Muslim philosophers found the courage to be critical of these
great masters, and, being inspired by the Qur'an, the sunnah, and also
by the civilization progress, they added to their works concepts that could
never have occurred to the Greeks. Admittedly, it was the topics related to
metaphysics and the unseen that the Muslims were most fervent about; but the
topic of the soul (al nafs) gradually gained momentum among the
philosophers and doctors, some of whom had different concepts of the soul from
Aristotle's. Thus, Al-Kindi, in opposition to Aristotle, asserted that the soul is an entity separate from the
body (Kasim, p.15). Similarly, Al-Farabi
whose opinion on the soul combines both the views of Aristotle and Plato, as,
in his eyes, the human being is made up of two entities: the body and the soul.
Al-Farabi however did not agree with Plato's position regarding the
transmigration of the souls (ibid, p.16). Yet, despite these additions made by
the Muslim philosophers particularly by Razi and Ibn Al-Qiyam on the concepts
of the soul and the spirit, their addendum were not considered as topics that
stood apart from philosophy. The same happened to Muslim scholars who wrote
about ethics, for example Ibn-Miskawayah's in his Tahdib Al - Akhlaq wa
Tatyib Al - A'raq, and Ibn-Hazm in his Mudawatu - nufus, although
the influence on these subjects derived more from the Qur'an and the sunnah,
than from Greek philosophy.
What I am trying to convey through this brief account of the status of
philosophy in the domain of Islamic thought, which started with Al-Kindi,
Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, and ended with Al-Ghazzali, Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Rushd,
is the emphasis that was placed on science during this period of Islamic
civilization, which demarcated their place from those established during the
reign of Greek philosophy. At this time there were also developments in the
fields of mathematics, logic, natural sciences, and theology by Muslim
philosophers using as their main sources the Qur'an and the prophetic
traditions (Hadith). In addition to the gains made from Greek and other
philosophies, there appeared new disciplines in the sciences of the Qur'an and Hadith, and other disciplines that
developed from them, for example, the study of the Arabic language and
literature. While some philosophers like Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina were trying to
reconcile the views of Aristotle with the Islamic aqida, others such as
Al-Ghazzali accused this group of heresy and disbelief. After refuting the
science of kalam and philosophy, he concluded that the Sufi path was the
way to attain 'true knowledge' (Kasim, 1969); whereas Ibn Rushd endeavored to
reconcile philosophy with religious law (shari'a).
Whilst
ulema like Ibn Taymiyyah, who concentrated on jurisprudence, refuted
Greek logic, he said: "I always knew that Greek logic is not needed by an
intelligent person and not beneficial to a stupid one." (p.29)
Ibn Taymiyyah criticized the Greek philosophers by showing the
corruption of their ideas in metaphysics and logic, due to the corruption of
their principles, and their restricting the means to achieve knowledge to
definitions and 'syllogistic demonstrations'. He goes even further and refutes
their arguments about 'the definitions' with which 'concepts' are known and
also the various forms of 'syllogisms' and their components 'the invariables'.
Ibn Taymiyyah also criticized the use of Greek logic by Al-Ghazzali in such
works as Al-Mustasfa and Mi'yar Al-ilm and Mihaku Nadhar.
Briefly, Ibn Taymiyyah's refutation of Greek logic is specifically a refutation
of Greek "formal logic", due to its sterility, a view that has just
recently been agreed to by Western scholars, too.
When we look at Ibn Khaldun's work, we see that he reserved a whole
chapter of his Al-Muqadima to "the refutation of philosophy and the
corruption of its source." He highlighted the predicament in which
Aristotle, his disciple Plato and the Muslim philosophers who followed them,
fell into, especially those Muslim philosophers who shaped their metaphysics
obsequiously on Aristotle (excepting Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina).
Ibn Khaldun dismissed the philosophers' contention glorifying reason and
rational thinking, summing up his views he said that "Philosophy does not
correspond with its aims, furthermore, it contradicts Divine law."
Despite his harsh
criticism, he does remain objective, and fair towards philosophy by stating the
positive aspects of this science such as:
- Nurturing mind,
- Training in organizing one's argumentation,
- Training in arriving to the point of an
intellectual discussion, by means of arguments and proofs (critical thinking).
In his
final point, however, he advises the students of philosophy to resort to the
status of "religious" law, and
to adhere to Qur'anic exegesis (tafsir) and jurisprudence (fiqh).
If such was the position of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldun vis-a-vis philosophy
and Greek logic, what place then did they, and other Muslim thinkers reserve
for sciences in their classifications of knowledge?
The classification of knowledge in Islamic
thought.
After Ibn Khaldun insisted that sciences prosper
when urbanization and civilization develop, he produced a classification of
knowledge organizing the sciences of his time. According to his classification,
sciences form into two groups: one is natural, human beings attain it through
intellectual acquisition; the other is traditional, they inherit it from
revealed sources. The first one refers to philosophical sciences and the second
one refers to natural sciences transmitted through revealed knowledge
information. Following this overview, he delved into the details of these
sciences and organized them as follows:
1) Traditional religious sciences, which
are divided into: exegesis, Qur'anic recitation, science of the Hadith, science
of the foundation of the law (usul al fiqh) and he adds to them
mysticism (tasawwuf) and dream interpretation.
2) Kalam, which
explains religious beliefs and defends them by means of rational arguments.
3) Linguistics, the study of language,
grammar, rhetoric, and literature.
4) Rational sciences, which he classified
as those sciences, known (during his time) under the name of the 'philosophical
sciences', into four groups: logic, physics (to which is attached medicine and
agriculture), metaphysics, and mathematics (to which is attached arithmetic,
geometry, astronomy and music). To these groups Ibn Khaldun added the science
of magic and talismans, and the science of chemistry. After he identified all
of these sciences and exposed their benefits and their harms, only then did he
reserve a chapter to "The refutation of philosophy and the corruption of
its origin" as mentioned above.
What
we observe regarding this classification is as follows:
1) Ibn Khaldun classified the various sciences
of his time into two distinct groups by virtue of the source (revealed and
rational), by virtue of the topic (law, aqida, language, logic, physics,
astronomy, geometry, music, agriculture etc.) and finally by virtue of their
methodology (based on revealed knowledge or reflection).
2) Despite Ibn Khaldun's distinction between the
"revealed sciences" and the "rational sciences", it is
worth noting that he does not, however, separate the natural sciences from
philosophy and hikmah.
3) Ibn Khaldun invented a new science, with its
own subject matter and
method (sociology), but he did not mention it in
his classification.
There
are, however, a great many Muslim thinkers who, in producing their
classifications of knowledge, have shown that the majority of non-religious
sciences and linguistics are intimately attached to philosophy. When speaking
of the classification of knowledge in the field of Islamic thought, Al Najjar
(1987) commented that the final purpose of science was "to be a servant of
religious truth, which is the ultimate objective for the emergence of sciences
and their progress." This seemingly elegant expression leaves us, in
actual fact, with a number of unanswered problems that Al Najjar did not attend
to.
1) He did not explain the concept of 'religious
truth' in his paper.
2) He asserted that this 'truth' "is the
ultimate objective for the emergence of sciences and their progress."
Which sciences are referred to here? and have all sciences really progressed to
the level of this ultimate truth "the service of religious truth"?
After describing the classification of knowledge of numerous Muslim
thinkers such as Ibn Nadim, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Khaldun and Ahmed ibn Mustapha; Al
Najjar raises questions and levels a criticism at these classifications and
claims that in the main they were based on
descriptions of science as they "were in reality", and not as
"they really ought to be."
The crux of the problem here is Al Najjar's desire for pure rationality
which revolves around 'how things ought to be'. This is an instance of philosophical
and ethical reasoning, being to the detriment of attempts to come to terms with
reality, and trying to change it or reform it in the light of "how things
really are". In fact, this escapism from reality and its portrayal in the
above terms, as well as escapism from
the study of causal and correlational
relationships among the different phenomena, amounts, although indirectly, to a
refutation of the inductive experimental method which is founded upon
investigation. The renunciation of the experimental method, dwelling upon Greek
logic or on Sufi thought, limiting ourselves to interpretation of the sacred
texts (i.e.. the Qur'an and the sunnah) are factors which have led to
the underdevelopment of the Muslim nations,
and is still draining their mental energies.
These energies and efforts that often start with
good intentions, end up generating ethical and idealistic concepts that are far
from the reality of the Muslim society at large. They are also far from
providing us with practical means to escape this retrogressiveness, and tackle
the issues through a grasp of the psychological and sociological aspects of the
Muslims' condition as it is today.
Therefore, the majority of publications now tend
to come under the heading of "the way things ought to be", thereby
ignoring reality. However, it is impossible to alter behavioral and social
phenomena to "the way things ought to be", if these phenomena are not
comprehended "as they really are".
Perhaps, mentioning psychology as an example of
a social science that endeavors to study and describe "reality as it is",
as much as possible, may assist us in discerning the aims of philosophy and
ethics from those of social sciences when analyzing behavioral phenomena.
Some of the aims of psychology as mentioned by
Zimbardo (1980) are as follows:
1) To describe behavior, activities and
experiments following gathering the data and information related to the area
which is under study.
2) To interpret given behavior within either a
cultural framework or model, or a particular theory.
3) To predict anticipated behavior based on
prior information and data, and then to understand the possible relationships
between them to enable conception of new relationships between certain
variables.
4) To control behavior so that it becomes
possible to monitor different variables and also to change some types of "deviated"
or abnormal behaviors.
5) To ameliorate people's standard of living
starting with an improvement in the various sectors including: the health,
education and social sectors.
Thus,
although psychology is a science that occupies itself with the study and
reporting of behavior 'as it is', it should not be labeled as a science that
cannot actually help in modifying behavior, and elevating it to the level of
'the way things ought to be'. Altering and improving behavior is precisely one
of its aims and that is achieved by means of training, education, learning and
at times, treatment.
At
this conjuncture I would like to indicate that one of the aims of psychology
from an Islamic viewpoint, may well be to fill the gap between that which is
'ideal' and that which is 'real', primarily at the conceptual level, and
secondly at the behavioral level.
Before
embarking on the topic of psychology in general, and psychology from an Islamic
perspective in particular, I wish to make reference to the classification of
the sciences by Ibn Khaldun and others. The topics which form the social
sciences at present, were not, in the estimation of the early ulema, topics which were distinguished from
philosophy, ethics, or religious sciences. On the contrary, we notice that subjects relevant to the social sciences were
scattered either under the category of kalam, as in the case of the
concepts of freedom and responsibility; or under the category of philosophy and
ethics, as in the concept of the soul, its potentialities, its actions, and the
scope of its knowledge; or in the case of
"illnesses of the heart", they were included under the headings
of ethics or tasawwuf.
Although
this may have been the general trend, we know that tentatively some topics
began to enjoy increasing appeal to the point that they appeared as categories
of their own. This included tax and financing in economy, and power, its
delegation and execution in politics. Others dealt with various psychological
and spiritual disturbances and their respective cures (spiritual healing), as
well as topics covering the field of nature, education and sociology. This
specialization and show of interest, and most importantly innovation in some
cases, reflects (as Ibn Khaldun indicated) the spread of civilization in the
Islamic cities, as well as an expressed need to arrive at practical solutions
to the diverse problems faced in these cities, in the intellectual fields and
other areas of life. Despite there being
no conflict to speak of between science and religion as such in Islamic
civilization; we find that there were some major differences between some ulema
in the field of fiqh and some philosophers, and that these were not
rare. These conflicts however need to be viewed in the context of intellectual
exchange. We have for instance, the discussion between Imam Ahmed ibn Hanbal
and the Mutazilites over the issue of the creation of the Qur'an, and the
arguments that took place between Imam Al-Ghazzali and Ibn-Rushd which were
compiled in the famous Tahafut al-falasifa (The Refutation of the
Philosophers) and Tahafut-u-Tahafut (The Refutation of the Refutation). Some
scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah may have, indeed, accused scholars like Al-Farabi
and Ibn Sina of disbelief, but this charge was not put forward during the
philosopher's lifetime, nor did it lead to punishment.
What
we hope to retain from these discussions is the manifestation of different
subjects and methods of dealing with them from the examples of the Muslim
scholars, as they studied the situations that were facing them; especially in
the areas of aqida, fiqh, logic and situations related to
political power. In the field of physics, there was no fundamental conflict
between Muslim thinkers, as they did not mix matters of faith with those that
pertained to the physical sciences. In the domain of history, the innovation of
Ibn Khaldun for instance, revolves primarily around his criticism of the
methods followed by his predecessors. He presented their mistakes and mishaps
objectively and eventually suggested a new subject and method for study, which
he called the sciences of civilization (sociology).
Interestingly, scholars like Ibn Khaldun,
innovators of new topics and disciplines, who extended their own ideas, as well
as gaining expertise in the field of education and learning, did not call for a
detachment or a separation between their area of specialization and the rest of
the sciences, such as the religious sciences. In spite of the lack of a
background to the claim for separation in the history of Islamic thought, the
dismemberment of the various disciplines of knowledge is, however, being
proposed today.
Is
it really their detachment from other disciplines that has impeded the
advancement of the social sciences in the Muslim world? Is there a definite
need to detach the social sciences from the rest of the Islamic sciences? And
what is the real difference between 'detachment' and the 'dismemberment' of the
sciences?
To
answer these questions, however, briefly, we need to address the following
issue of the relationship between the topics of modern social sciences and
those of religious sciences (aqida, law and fiqh) in the Islamic
setting.
The relationship between social sciences and
religious sciences.
The
understanding of the Holy Qur'an and the honorable Hadith, and the application
of their teachings are, undoubtedly, the platforms from which are launched the
religious and the linguistic sciences in the world of Islam. Nevertheless,
throughout Islamic history what has actually happened is that excessive
attention, a plethora we might say, has been paid towards ritual jurisdiction,
to the detriment of jurisdiction which regulates the relationships between the
Muslims themselves, and with their environment. This plethora has its own
political and psychological motives. Al-Banna tackled these motives in 1996, in
his book For a New Jurisdiction.
I, myself, in fact, offered this as a subject for discussion to the students
of post-graduate studies in the Institute of Fundamental Religious Studies (M'ahad
usul al din) in Algiers several years
ago; as this topic has great relevance to the advancement of the sciences from
an Islamic viewpoint in the past, the present and also in the future. The aim
was not merely discussion of the topic for the sake of discussion, but to show
ultimately that it was necessary not to opt for a cut and dry separation of the
sciences, but rather to opt for a separation of purpose. What is inferred by a
separation of purpose is the study in depth of a given science after defining
its topic and its methodology with precision. In no way should this suggest a
divorce between the religious sciences and the social sciences as was suggested
in the West, in order to separate religion from science on the one hand, and
philosophy from the rest of the sciences on the other.
What
we are calling for in the context of Islamization of knowledge is for
the sciences to be “integrative” once their philosophical frameworks, topics
and methodologies are clearly defined, and not allowing one science to reign
over another unless due to the criterion of law, reason or a combination of both.
Failing to achieve the above mentioned “integration” could result in:
1) The sad separation of the sciences from each
other in general and in particular science from religion, as is already the
case in a number of Western and Muslim countries. This is most noticeable at
the university level and in specialized institutes in the Muslim World, where
the specialist in religious sciences barely knows about psychology and
sociology, and similarly the specialist in the social sciences knows precious
little about the religious sciences.
2) The jumbling up of the topics and the
methodologies of these sciences and their aims; in addition to the possibility
of experiencing the domination of the methodology pursued in some sciences over
that of others, for example, the
possibility of experiencing the hegemony of the religious scholars and scholars
of jurisprudence (the fuqahah) over the other scientists. This would
freeze any amelioration in these areas.
To
avoid such a sad separation or domination, a number of recommendations have
been proposed to tighten the gap between the Islamic sciences and the ulema
on one hand, and the modern social sciences and their specialists on the other,
in the Muslim world. The following are a number of recommendations that have
been put forward in the Muslim world as models in social sciences. They explain
the positions of different scholars and their endeavors to tackle this issue
from an Islamic perspective.
In a short epistle (1989), Al-Faruqi endeavored to give social sciences
an Islamic tone. After he had shown the shortcomings of Western methodology in
the study of Social Sciences and of
their scholars; for example the fact that they had overlooked spiritual
aspects, their biases, and the fact that they had distanced values from the
field of social science. Al-Faruqi then moved on to elaborate on the issue of
how to give the social sciences an "Islamic tuning." To realize this,
he suggested the following:
1- The “re-integration” of all studies and
sciences under the banner of 'Unity' (tawhid).
2- The need for social sciences to focus on
Allah's vicegerency, which implies man's vicegerency. Following which these
sciences could be called "Sciences of the Ummah." Al-Faruqi
stressed that the study of a society cannot be free of judgmental values.
3 - Sciences of the Ummah should not be
neglected in favor of natural sciences, they should occupy the same position of
importance.
4 - The study of reality should not lead to the
neglect of "how things ought to be."
After this appeal, Al-Faruqi goes on to explain the principles that a
scholar of social science should abide by, the first of which is Islam and what
it aims for; then, to keep close to the Divine Model which manifested in human
terms by the Prophet; to take heed of values; to work to search for the truth
in the light of that Divine Model; and, whenever it is possible, to produce a
new format of criticism in the social sciences; Are
these pre-requisites sufficient to secure the casting of an Islamic tone over
the social sciences? Can we generalize Al-Faruqi's criticism about the Western
social sciences? And can we validate the
application of individual Western social scientists to the social sciences as a
whole?
I
will not pretend that I am able to give answers to these questions in this
short study. However, I would like to share an opinion that the nature of the
relationship between the social sciences and religion in the West may shed a
light or give an indirect answer to these questions and that, as we are aware,
will demand engagement in debates, and lucid answers from the Muslim thinkers
and researchers, without prejudice or reticence. Al-Faruqi sowed the initial
seeds in the field of the 'Islamization of Knowledge', and on the very
sensitive topic of 'casting social sciences with an Islamic tone'. He also
opened the door to whoever followed him to organize conferences and congresses
in order to deepen the study and form different viewpoints. Thus, the
International Institute of Islamic Thought held many conferences with the
object of cementing this idea, and bringing it to the verge of practice and
scientific theorizing. However, these attempts have not been made without
enduring some superficial and simplistic approaches to the issue at stake;
neither did it go without causing negative reactions nor having to face
opposition, at least in some aspect of the project, as expressed in the views
of Burhan Ghalion (1993). I will skim over these opinions as the subject does
not require a profound study or a full appraisal here.
In
1992, during a conference which was held in
If we consider this last topic as a sample of the many theses forwarded during that conference,
we note that Al-Dhawadi defined the concepts of 'objectivity' and
'subjectivity', he then moved on to elucidate the motives for subjectivity in
the social sciences in the West. He argued that the crisis that has been
endured by man and social sciences for the last two decades at least, is by and
large referred back to the issue of objectivity and subjectivity (p.7) and to
consolidate this view, he discussed the increasing amount of criticism from
Western scholars and specialists, directed at social and human sciences in the
West.
Al-Dhawadi
is undoubtedly has a right to proceed by giving the claims and views that
support his position; however, the mere listing of claims without arguing them,
and not giving the counter-arguments could also be seen as a bias that Muslim
scholars should avoid. As to the crisis of the social sciences in the Muslim
world; in his opinion it can be traced
back to two problems 1) our uncritical acceptance of concepts of man and
society that stem from the experimental, materialist Western mind, and 2) the
fact that since coming under the spell of the West, we have not continued the
study of Ibn Khaldun's idea, to gain and access the sources of experimental
intellectual knowledge on the one hand, and the sources of psychological,
spiritual, and transcendental knowledge on the other.
For
my part, I have no objection to adopting Ibn Khaldun's model for the study of
civilization, the analysis of history, on the basis of the descriptive and
historical model that he adopted. However, I have reservations concerning the
first problem identified by Al-Dhawadi, which is based on our uncritical
acceptance of concepts of man and society which stem from the experimental and
materialist Western mind. Firstly, this
claim cannot be generalized, as it does not apply to all of us; and secondly,
the effects of this wholesale adoption of Western concepts is not obvious. If
this adoption had taken place we would have noticed the spread of empirical
thought among the Muslim social scientists, however this is not the case. There
is, in fact, such a general and complete withdrawal from experimentation that
one worries whether we might be suffering from 'experimentation phobia'.
After
this, Al-Dhawadi addressed the field of psychology, and commented on its use of
mice, pigeons and monkeys for the purpose of conducting laboratory behavioral
experiments which, in his words, has become "commonplace in Psychology and
the results are applied to human behavior. This means that psychologists do not
differentiate between man and animals,"(p.19)
Again, I have no qualms with this being applicable, to a certain extent,
on the followers of the behaviorist school; but how can it be extended to all
the branches of psychology (of which there are almost fifty today), and to
individual psychologists who belong to different schools which have completely
different methodologies?
In addition to the potent efforts of the late Al-Faruqi in highlighting
the serious issue of the necessity to cast the social sciences with an Islamic
tone; and efforts made by scholars in The Association of Muslim Social
Scientists and other institutions and individuals; there appeared in 1979 an
article by Malik Badri from his book The Dilemma of Muslim Psychologists.
In my estimation, Badri's work made an unquestionable contribution to show the
position of ethical and religious aspects in the study of psychology. Laying
bare the dilemma of Muslim psychologists is, needless to say, of great
necessity but remains insufficient in the face of the problem. Should we not,
perhaps, refrain from being obsessed with our problems and rise above our
constraints, taming our criticism of Western social sciences? Should our
endeavors not converge towards developing the social sciences with precise
topics and strict methodologies, to enable us to obtain a clear understanding
of Muslim realities, and to stimulate us to resolve the problems in a
scientific way that does not uproot our faith nor our consciousness? Thus, in
Dr. Badri's work we have been, indeed, warned against the dangers of being in
the 'Lizard's hole', but we are still left short of finding ways to get out of
it.
The
majority of the exertions made by Muslim scholars working on the issue of
knowledge, could be reduced to superficial claims about Western social sciences
being in a crisis, that they are prejudiced, against values, have ignored the
spiritual aspect, are not humane, and finally, that they are also secular.
Sadly, apart from some rare exceptions, one does not often come across scholars
who discuss the raison - d'etre of these sciences, the actual part they
play in diagnosing problems, and to solving some of them, or any other positive
factors. (See Rajeb, 1996)
It is true that some institutions,
universities and colleges begin to appear here and there in the Muslim world
with intentions to devise curricula that will assure the “integration” of
instruction in "revealed knowledge" with instruction in modern social
science, in the hope that this would ease the reticence felt by both parties.
Despite these exceptions, one still witnesses that proposals put forward by
Muslim scholars to overcome this crisis are still, to my understanding, far too
idealistic and not scientific. One cannot but hold in deep respect, the candid
endeavors of the scholars, but I question whether this pattern of thought
should become our way of legitimizing the social sciences.
The
reality is, that the origins of these ventures, that aim at subjugating all
sciences to the methodology and the fundamentals of religious sciences are not
recent. They can be traced back to the middle period of the Islamic
civilization, when the doctors of kalam were immersed in the acute
question of the relationship between reason and revelation (Attiya, 1980), for
example, Ibn Rushd discussion in his book Final conclusions and accounts of
the connections of Philosophy and Law (Fasl al-magal, wa taqrir ma bayna
al-shariati wal hikmati min itisal).
Recently Dr. Jamal Attiya held a seminar on the issue of jurisprudence
and the social sciences during which he asked these two questions:
1) Is it within the means of jurisprudence to
make contributions towards the development of methodologies in social sciences?
2) Can jurisprudence gain something from the
methodologies of the social sciences?
According to Attiya there are two groups with two different answers to
these questions. One that emphatically rejects the methodology of
jurisprudence, this is the view of the specialists in the social sciences, (but
he did not specify whether he was alluding to Muslims or non-Muslims ): and a
second that believes that "the social sciences cannot develop if they are
tied to strict criteria" (p.11) As
for Dr. Attiya himself, he is of the opinion that the science of jurisprudence
was originally designed to make the orders of Allah precise and clear, and
subsequently to deduct rules from them. It was not designed to explain social
phenomena and causal relationships, nor to find the rules which control these
phenomena. It is therefore unjust to ask the science of jurisprudence to bear a
burden that it cannot take. (p.12)
Dr.
Attiya's input to finding way for possible cooperation and “integration”
between jurisprudence and the social sciences is not to be discredited. It is
just as he himself pointed, that jurisprudence is founded on deductive methods.
I would like to add here, that the social sciences are founded on both the
deductive and the inductive methods; generally making more use of the latter.
The
desire to subjugate the social sciences to jurisprudence, whether it be from
the aspect of methodology or content, is still luring Muslim researchers up
until now. The periodical of Islamization of knowledge Islamiyat al Marifa,
in its first edition (June, 1995), published an article by Doctor Louay Safi,
the title of which was Towards a fundamentalist methodology for social
studies.
This unconditional criticism which spared none of the scholars, with the
exception of Ibn Khaldun, is difficult for me to accept. Nevertheless, I find
myself in agreement with
Disregard for inductive methodology was common among Muslim scholars,
excepting the efforts of Razi and Jaber ibn Hayan in medicine and science, and
Al Shatibi in shari'a, who all contributed to the development of
induction as a methodology for research. Despite the efforts of these scholars,
exceptional as they were, they were unable to lead to the propagation of the
experimental spirit, nor to the establishment of inductive methods to conduct
and execute experiments among the Muslim nation. After a critical review of
methodology in the Muslim context,
In
reference to the fundamental methodology proposed by
When
we ponder over endeavors that hope to legitimize social sciences, by creating
bridges between them and the sciences of the shari'a, especially with
jurisprudence, we will notice; unfortunately, that the Muslim mind is
infatuated with the power of its heritage, and finds itself fettered by its own
manacles. Some of the leading figures in the Islamization of knowledge
movement have indeed been alerted to the hindering weight of heritage, which,
if mishandled, reinforces the grip of its traditional concepts and
methodologies on the Muslim mind. These scholars, despite regarding the Muslim
heritage as one of the richest of all human heritage, insist that we should see
to it that it is filtered, as it cannot
be followed 'through thick and thin till death do us part'.
This
is perhaps what led Dr. Alouani (1993) to affirm that Islamization of knowledge
as a methodology of knowledge revolves around the six main axes, i.e..: the
methodological treatment of the Qur'an, the sunnah, Islamic heritage,
and human heritage, the formation and building of a Qur'anic methodology, and
lastly the building of a contemporary Islamic knowledge system. Without a
positive and conscientious intercourse with the heritage, it could become a
factor that may become a stumbling block to what could otherwise be discovered
by the Muslims about the universal knowledge contained in the Qur'an.
Consequently this heritage may produce another heritage that might be
considered by a thirsty person as water, when in actual fact it is only a
mirage. This type of heritage cannot effectively motivate a society.
During
a seminar on the Islamization of knowledge (June, 1996 in Malaysia) Dr. Alouani
insisted on a sober criticism, and a revision of a number of matters related to
perception, timing, and movement towards religion, innovation and change. He
drew attention to three steps:
- The revision of the studies based on the
Qur'an.
- The revision of the studies of the Sunnah, and
their interpretations.
- The revision of heritage studies.
Besides
the hegemony of fundamental methodology (i.e.. that based on deductive Qur'anic
analysis); its impact and grip on the minds of many contemporary Muslim
thinkers; and the weight of jurisdictional, theological and political pressure
they have been subjected to, contemporary Muslim thinkers have to also face the
looming danger of the 'normative theory' with its jurisdictional values, and
other impending complications that are often presented in the form of dualisms,
e.g.. true and the false. We do not hesitate to say that these looming dangers,
and the excessive desire to criticize the West as a way of trying to dispel
Western domination, will have grave consequences on theorization and diagnosis
operations, and ultimately on the ability to provide solutions for the
underdeveloped state of the Ummah.
Abu
Sulayman (1992) stated that one of those consequences would be the 'live burial
of social sciences'. He explained that the development of events and political
conflicts in Muslim countries had brought about a separation between the
political leadership and the intellectual leadership. He said that immersion in
descriptive and traditional studies; living meagerly on the literalism
methodology and the sciences relevant only to the Qur'an; as well as the
separation of the intellectual leadership (especially the jurisdictional) from
the political leadership are, among the factors that have hindered the progress
of social sciences, and led to the plethora of doctrinal writings on ritual
jurisprudence (Fiqh al-Ibadat) to the detriment of transactional
jurisprudence (Fiqh al-Muamalat). This was explained by Al-Banna (1996),
who demonstrated that the political factors which had prompted the accumulation
of Fiqh al-Ibadat, continue until today. One of the worst sequels of
this 'ritualistic accumulation', to use Al-Banna's words, is the fact that it
is causing a distortion so profound and so
pervasive, that it is virtually becoming synonymous with today's Muslim
personality.
For
even though this unrestrained attack on traditional jurisdiction, blaming it
for the backwardness and the distortion of the personality of Muslims, could be
regarded as harsh, the fact remains that Al-Banna and Abu Suleyman, among
others, have somehow put their finger right on the long malady which has made
the Muslims be unable to progress. This has been epitomized in the intellectual
aspect, particularly in regard to methodology, due to the importance of
the categorization of the sciences being
based on the criteria of their content and methodology. In fact, to make the
utilization of these sciences feasible for Islamic societies, it is incumbent
on us to by-pass the unrealistic intellectual problematic of 'reason and
revelation', 'the Qur'an and actuality', 'the true and the false', 'normativism
and positivism' and 'certitude and speculation' and so forth. It is unrealistic
that all our energies be expended on the treatment, repetition and reiteration
of these problematic from centuries ago, and them still consuming so much of
our time and efforts. It has almost become like an obsession ruling over
conscious and subconscious alike, despite the existence of guidance in the
Qur'an and the vast amount of literature left behind by many thinkers in the
league of Ibn Rushd or Ibn Taymiyyah.
Adding
to these problematic issues is the question of ethics or aqida and their
influences on the sciences. One can hardly read anything today that does not
refer to the prejudice of Western social sciences, the fact of their being
driven by Western values, or their overlooking the issue of 'values'
altogether! It is worth saying here, that the nature of knowledge or science is
impartial it is rather its usage and the direction taken by human beings that
produces prejudice.
In other words objectivity and subjectivity are
qualities that pertain to humans, and not to sciences, or even to art. Those
who claim that the social sciences have overlooked, for example, values, often
said this at a time when it had become a major theme in psychology and
sociology, enjoying discussion in a number of books and studies being
published. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent us from studying values
ourselves from an Islamic perspective, and including it in our psycho-social
studies? Hand-cuffing the social sciences to the statute laws of values will
not give birth to social sciences, but rather to ethics, Sufism, religious
sciences and so forth.
Indeed,
the subjugation of social sciences to fundamental methodology, or chaining them
to the laws of ethics would, inevitably be conducive to the investigation of
the true and the false; and the question of belief and disbelief. This in turn,
would hold us hostages under the uneasy weight of heritage; where as a
practice, all differences in the traditional sciences are to be sent back with
immediacy to ethical law, as Dr. Alouani pointed out. It is because Islamic
sciences are based on the fundamentals of religion and jurisdiction, which are
both established on the same ethical laws that some serious dualism have
emerged in Islamic thought i.e..: those who are right and those who are wrong;
the saved sect and the damned sect, etc. So as to avoid such intellectual
standards, it is more laudable to refrain from our obsession with this dualism
(Alouani, 1996), and practice the famous Arabic saying: "Savor that which
is clear from that which is unclear."
It
goes without saying that, we as specialists of social studies, are under the
obligation to promulgate these sciences to the service of religion and the
Islamic nation, in the light of this I would like to suggest the following
principles:
1) To avoid, as much as it is possible, reference
to ethical laws during the study of
psychological, sociological and historical phenomena. This does not
insinuate estrangement of the topic of ethics, nor to rejecting Islamic values.
On the contrary, the topic of ethics ought to be regarded as a specific one in
psychology, and ought to enjoy scientific study with the aim of showing the gap
that exists between the world of ethics in Islam, and the world in which the
Muslims are behaving. This could be done in the light of some major factors such
as personality, age, sex, environment, culture and history.
2) To avoid being engulfed by heritage, and
being maladroit in its application to contemporary psychological phenomena,
especially with a heritage that is strongly influenced by Greek philosophy and
medicine, and by bygone conceptions.
3) To avoid extreme positions vis-a-vis that
which is not Islamic, and benefit from the heritage of humanity, with justice
and good faith. Needless to say, heritage is not just Western, but also
Eastern, Southern and Northern also!
4) To avoid a blind imitation of the West in all
its theories, philosophies, and ideological backgrounds.
5) To sanction the Holy Qur'an and the sunnah
as the two sources of knowledge that are complementary to the universal
knowledge which man has formulated by way of using deductive, inductive and
other methods of scientific research; maintaining these two sources as the main
references in matters of aqida, ethics, morals and conduct.
6) To refer to the social sciences and their
various branches to describe Muslim problems, psychological, sociological and
educational etc.. Thereby creating a description endowed with such precision
that it should enable us to adopt strategies and plans relevant to Muslim
society, and in accordance with its environmental, cultural and historical
conditions.
7) To establish Islamic institutions
specializing in social sciences, and to form organizations and bodies which
would set up networks enabling Muslim specialists to exchange experiences and
cooperate in various fields, and for the publication of specialized journals.
8) At the university level, there is a need to
devise methodologies that will help us to secure the “integration” of Islamic
knowledge with specialization in social sciences, as well as a need for experts
and specialists to contribute to the publication of books and reading material
for the various specialties.
What I am attempting to say briefly is, that our criticism of the West
is marred by emotionalism and reductionism, as we are inclined to view human
heritage as connoting Western heritage only. Due to this attitude, we show
either a feigned ignorance or a lack of awareness of the multiplicity and
variety in Western, as well as universal thought. We also ignore the criticism
of Western thought from within itself; and not only that, failing to grasp new
specialties in the West, we are likely to reduce the meaning of science in the
West, to secularism, in the same way that we have reduced psychology to
'Freudianism' The truth of the matter is that there are many sub-schools even
in 'Freudianism'. The number of specialties in psychology alone is now more
than fifty, and the American Psychological Association is one century old. It
is true that these specialization's are there for the service of man and
society, and that some of them are also devised to exert their influence on us,
to oppose us, and to invade us culturally and psychologically, and they might,
indeed, work to deepen our conflicts and sectarianism and busy us more and more
with deadly superficialities.
If this happens, on what grounds do we have for putting the blame, of
our own incompetence and failure, on the West, or other than the West; and
reducing ourselves to playing the victim, simply turning a blind eye to the
fact that the terms of defeat lie within our own hands.
We can summarize the different positions and attitudes to moving
foreword in the following way:
1) Religious thinkers and scholars of
jurisprudence (the fuqaha) in particular, should cooperate with
specialists in the social sciences. This recommendation was included in Malek
Bennabi's book The Muslim in the Economic World (1979 edition). In this
work he appealed to the experts in economics to cooperate with the fuqaha,
in economic matters. According to Bennabi the specific function of the fuqaha
is to restrict themselves to saying whether or not the proposals put forward by
the specialists are acceptable, according to the principles of Islamic
jurisprudence.
2) What is being proposed in the field of social
sciences should be publicized. It is from this point of view that the scholar
of religion or jurisprudence is able to ascertain whether there is any
contradiction between the intellectual findings of the social sciences; the fundamentals
of faith; the principles of religious law; and matters of jurisprudence. One of
those scholars that made this point recently is Ibrahim Rajeb (1996), and his
view is not unlike Bennabi's.
3) Studies should rely on methodology properly
suited to the social sciences (see
Although I am happy to present these views to
you, and to read about them for my own knowledge, I do not support these
proposals, as they appear to promote the religious scholar to the status of a
final judge.
Nevertheless, I feel that cooperation should
start at the grass-roots to avoid falling into circumstances which facilitate
the monopoly and domination of the former over the latter, and even reach the
stage where the religious scholar would actually refuse from the outset, a
great many psychological and sociological theses.
Dr. Rajab mentioned that in a private encounter, one religious scholar
had asked him about his field of specialization, and that when he had told him
that he was a specialist in social sciences, the scholar turned away murmuring
"I seek refuge in Allah from this" !!! Now, how can it be conceived
that a specialist would exhibit the cream of his work to this 'pseudo-scholar'?
This attitude is fortunately a rare one.
Moreover, these trends, in particular the third, aims at, I am afraid,
to propagate the domination of the science of jurisprudence's methodologies
over social sciences, which is a methodology that is more suited to deal with
theoretical texts and forms. Thus, to avoid these same dilemmas, and to bring
the social sciences and religious sciences closer, it is important that the
specialist in religious sciences should undertake some psychological and social
studies, as is happening at the Islamic University of Qucentina (Eastern
Algeria), the Institute of Fundamental Religious Studies in Algiers, and the
International Islamic University of Malaysia. Likewise, the specialist in
social sciences should undertake some religious studies (again this is being
practiced at the International Islamic University of Malaysia), but
unfortunately this second combination is very rare.
Once
the appropriate methodology and curriculum to achieve these goals have been
established, some results are anticipated as a consequence of the closure of
this gap:
1) The development of future generations of
multi-accomplished scholars, who besides mastering their specialty, do not
suffer from ignorance, nonchalance,
shortcomings or incompetence in other fields, especially not in those that are
related to their fields of specialization.
2) The development of future generations of
scholars and researchers who will not only assert the position, and epitomize
the methodology of intellectual “integration” between the Islamic sciences and
the social sciences, but also the “integration” and the interaction of the
various factors that contribute to the formation of psychological and social
phenomena.
3) The development of future generations of
scholars and researchers who are able to make personal efforts in elaborating
on the field of religious sciences, based on a sound interpretation of the
sources, and an ability to decipher reality at the same time. This would revive
the exercise of personal judgment based on the Scriptures (ijtihad) and
would assist in intellectual exertion in the field of Fiqh al-Muamalat
rather than adding to the already existing surplus in Fiqh al-Ibadat.
4) The
development of future generations of specialists in social science who
are well informed about the place of revelation as a source of knowledge, and
who are also well aware of psychological and social realities when studying any
phenomena related to their field.